Part 2: Is there an optimal number of public companies?
This is Part 2 of Dr. Mikhail Pevzner cost–benefit analysis of the question of more IPOs and capital formation, regulation, and investor welfare.
This is Part 2 of a guest article by Dr. Mikhail Pevzner, my friend and a research colleague who is a Professor of Accounting at the University of Baltimore’s Merrick School of Business. He teaches financial accounting, auditing, financial statement analysis, business valuation and business economics. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Finance at Georgetown University’s McDonough School of Business where he teaches financial regulation, valuation and corporate finance.
Since obtaining his PhD at Washington University in St. Louis in 2007, Dr. Pevzner has published over 40 original research and policy articles in financial accounting, auditing, and corporate finance. He has also served as a visiting economist at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority where he worked on economic analyses of rule-makings related to auditors, financial accounting disclosures, broker/dealers and investment advisors. Dr. Pevzner also works as a litigation economics expert specializing in business and personal damages cases. More about his work can be found at
https://mikhailpevzner.com/ and on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/in/mikhail-pevzner-07604a1/
Part 1 can be found here.
Is there an optimal number of public companies? (Part 1)
This is a guest article by Dr. Mikhail Pevzner, my friend and a research colleague who is a Professor of Accounting at the University of Baltimore’s Merrick School of Business. He teaches financial accounting, auditing, financial statement analysis, business valuation and business economics. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Finance at Georgetown Unive…
V. Are Current Regulatory Costs the Binding Constraint?
A common argument is that regulatory burdens—lengthy disclosures, internal control audits, PCAOB inspections of audits —discourage firms from going public. It is true that 10-K filings can exceed 300 pages and that risk disclosures are often repetitive.[1] Much of this content reflects legal risk mitigation rather than substantive new information.[2]
However, the marginal cost of such disclosure may be lower than assumed. Once routine language is established, updates are incremental[3]. There is evidence that average audit fees have been increasing at the speed of around 10% in recent years,[4] but this effect is likely skewed as audit fees have declined on the size-adjusted and inflation-adjusted basis.[5] Audit pricing pressures appear to have intensified as firms incorporate automation and AI. For example, on February 6, 2026, the Financial Times reported that KPMG UK pressed its own external auditor, Grant Thornton UK, to pass on AI cost savings.[6]
To my knowledge, there is hardly any evidence that retail investors demand more audit depth beyond standard audit opinion,[7] or ever claim that audit fees are too low to support an unqualified audit opinion. That is, the audit functions for most as a pass-fail certification mechanism.[8]
Moreover, issuers most sensitive to modest cost reductions are often smaller and riskier, and choose audit firms accordingly. Research in accounting and auditing consistently shows that operational complexity and aggressive accounting practices are correlated with fraud and restatements. For example, one audit firm and its sole signing partner—described by the SEC as a “sham audit mill”—issued audit opinions for 168 public issuers in 2021.[9] The firm was subsequently permanently barred from auditing public companies. The SEC found that its deliberate and systemic failures to comply with Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) standards were incorporated into more than 1,500 SEC filings between January 2021 and June 2023.[10] This episode illustrates a broader concern: relaxing oversight could disproportionately affect precisely those smaller and riskier issuers—and audit firms—that warrant the most scrutiny.[11]
VI. Which Firms Would Go Public Earlier?
If regulatory burdens were meaningfully reduced, which firms would choose to list earlier?
High-quality firms with strong private financing options likely prefer to remain private longer, preserving control and negotiating favorable capital terms, as has been happening in more recent years with all the private “unicorns”.[12] Firms that lack sufficient access to more abundant private capital may be more inclined to seek public markets sooner.
That dynamic raises a concern: policy designed to increase IPO volume may disproportionately attract riskier firms—those more desperate for capital not otherwise available from venture capitalists or from other sources. Some might succeed spectacularly. Others may resemble smaller-scale versions of Enron rather than Microsoft.
Going Public Too Early: Who Enters and Why?
The current policy conversation assumes that if we reduce regulatory burdens, more firms will choose to go public, and that this is inherently beneficial. But it is important to ask a more basic question: which firms would go public earlier if the rules were relaxed?
Firms that have strong products, strong growth prospects, and access to abundant private capital are not under pressure to relinquish control. They can raise funds from venture capital, private equity, sovereign wealth funds, or other private sources. In today’s globalized capital markets, high-quality firms often have multiple financing options. They do not need to enter public markets prematurely.
In contrast, the firms most sensitive to marginal reductions in regulatory cost are those that are more capital-constrained. If modest savings in compliance expense meaningfully change their decision to go public, that suggests they were closer to the margin to begin with.
This raises a straightforward economic concern: relaxing entry frictions may disproportionately induce riskier firms to list earlier.
That does not mean such firms cannot succeed. Some will. But the relevant comparison is not between a hypothetical new Microsoft and a hypothetical average firm. It is between the probability of becoming a long-term success and the probability of underperformance or failure.
Encouraging firms to go public earlier also means encouraging founders to give up control earlier—unless dual-class structures are used. That is a substantive shift. Going public is fundamentally a sale of ownership. It changes who bears risk and who exercises influence. If founders choose to remain private longer under current rules, that is itself information about their assessment of costs and benefits.
The Dot.com IPO boom of late-1990s illustrates what can happen when firms enter public markets rapidly and at scale.[13] At the time, many firms listed with limited earnings history and unstable business models. Combined with intense benchmark pressure from analysts and investors, this created incentives for aggressive accounting practices. The resulting wave of restatements and frauds was not random. It reflected the interaction of public-market incentives and the characteristics of the firms that entered.
The policy question, therefore, is not simply whether we can reduce the cost of public status. It is whether inducing earlier entry improves overall welfare once we account for the distribution of outcomes across firms and investors.
If we lower thresholds and more companies go public, the marginal entrant is unlikely to be the most stable and well-capitalized firm. It is more likely to be a firm that needs access to public capital sooner, and could be subjected more to newer and inherently more uncertain emerging technologies, such as AI or crypto.[14] If Dot.com boom is any model, many of today’s AI-driven early IPOs are unlikely to survive.[15] That fact alone does not determine whether relaxing IPO regulatory constraints is good or bad—but it must be part of the cost–benefit analysis.
VII. Toward a Rational Cost–Benefit Framework
The debate should not revolve around a nostalgic benchmark for the number of public companies. It should revolve around measurable costs and benefits:
What is the marginal social benefit of additional public listings?
What is the marginal social cost in terms of fraud risk, volatility, and investor losses?
How does early public exposure alter founder incentives and governance dynamics?
Are private markets currently filling capital formation needs efficiently?
Investors and firms are utility-maximizing entities responding to incentives. When incentives favor rapid public listings during speculative booms, history shows that fraud risk and earnings management rise. When regulatory costs increase in response, capital formation may shift to private channels.
The objective of policy should be neither maximizing nor minimizing the number of public companies, but optimizing the trade-off between capital access, investor protection, governance quality, and systemic stability.
What Is the Equilibrium Number of Public Companies?
An important insight in this debate is that we do not actually know what the equilibrium number of public companies in the economy should be. Is it 10,000? 20,000? Should we measure it as a percentage of total businesses in the United States? As a percentage of total market capitalization? As a share of available capital? There is no obvious benchmark.
Historically, the number of public companies as a percentage of all businesses has always been small. Even if there were roughly 8,000–10,000 public firms in the early 2000s, the overall economy has grown significantly since then. Inflation alone has increased materially over the last twenty-five years. So looking purely at the absolute count of public companies does not tell us much.
It is also difficult to compare public and private capital directly. Private companies are largely a black box. We do not know their true capitalization or scale in aggregate.[16] However, while the number of public firms has declined, it is unclear whether the relative level of public vs. private capital has declined also.
At the same time, what we do observe is increased concentration of ownership among institutional investors, particularly large mutual funds and other passive vehicles. This concentration raises questions. Passive managers are not typically involved in day-to-day management. It is not clear how intensively they monitor managerial behavior. There is evidence suggesting that such ownership structures may reduce monitoring incentives. It is also not clear that this concentration necessarily benefits ultimate shareholders in mutual fund portfolios.[17]
More broadly, as more household wealth flows into 401(k)s and other retirement accounts invested in passive funds, a large portion of public equity becomes concentrated in institutions that are highly diversified and often reactive. Mutual funds are sensitive to downside risk; they can exit declining stocks quickly. But they have less incentive to engage deeply in value-maximizing restructuring of specific firms. This dynamic has helped fuel the rise of activist investors, who step in where passive investors lack incentives to intervene.
All of this suggests that we do not have a clear model of what the “ideal” level of dispersed public ownership should be. Public ownership carries costs that are often ignored.
The Alleged Benefits of More Public Companies
One frequently cited benefit of increasing the number of public companies is improved price discovery, i.e. obtaining market-based valuations of a firm whose shares are actively traded rather than having to rely on more subjective valuations for private companies.[18] The argument is that more public trading, i.e. higher levels of stock liquidity, leads to more efficient incorporation of information into prices.[19] In theory, market efficiency implies that information is impounded into stock prices rapidly.[20]
But that presumes the presence of relevant (i.e. timely information important to assessing shares’ fundamental value) and reliable (i.e. trustworthy) information. There is tension in the policy discussion: on one hand, we are told that more public companies and more trading enhance efficiency; on the other hand, there are calls to reduce disclosure requirements because producing information is costly and not always necessary. If we end up with more public companies but less information, it is not clear how that improves price discovery.
Liquidity and cost of capital arguments are also invoked. Liquidity refers to an investor’s ability to trade when they want to without incurring unreasonable costs. Greater stock liquidity is associated with lower overall expected returns for these stock ( cost of capital) because higher trading costs (e.g. higher price impact) of less liquid stocks are priced into expected returns.[21] But liquidity depends on several components: trading costs, inventory risk borne by market makers, and information asymmetry (which drives potential negative pricing impacts). If valuation uncertainty is high, liquidity will be impaired. Small IPOs with significant uncertainty may end up thinly traded, sometimes effectively over-the-counter. In such cases, the reduction in cost of capital would be unlikely.
Public ownership also requires corporate governance infrastructure. When ownership is dispersed, corporate governance mechanisms must compensate for the loss of concentrated control. Boards of directors, audit committees, compensation committees, takeover defenses, and other mechanisms must function properly to protect minority shareholders. These structures are costly. They require legal advisors, consultants, compliance systems, and active engagement. They do not come for free.
Another common argument is that broader equity participation reduces wealth inequality. Indeed, extant research demonstrates that stock market participation is positively correlated with investor wealth levels.[22] So, it stands to reason that giving access to broader swath of investors who can buy cheaper public company stocks will result in long-term wealth creation, as these stocks gain in value, similar to what happened to Microsoft over the years. That claim relies heavily on the assumption that upside gains from public market participation will outweigh downside losses. It may have been true in some periods. It may not hold in others. There is no law that stock markets must always rise, even though they have risen over long horizons historically. Ignoring downside risk risks misleading investors.
Marginal Costs and Marginal Benefits
In equilibrium, the question of how many public companies we should have is a marginal analysis. What is the marginal social benefit of one additional public company? And what is the marginal social cost?
The benefits include broader investor access, broader participation in economic growth, and dispersion of information through public markets.
The costs include greater exposure to financial downside, particularly if relaxing standards invites weaker or riskier firms into public markets. The costs also include the real expense of maintaining the scaffolding necessary for public companies to function properly: governance structures, internal controls, compliance systems, and enforcement.
If incentives for public listing increase, enforcement must also increase to counterbalance the greater risk of misconduct. Yet enforcement capacity itself has constraints. Regulatory agencies operate with limited staffing and resources. Expanding the public-company universe while reducing enforcement capacity would increase systemic risk. How does the desire for more public companies jive with the recent SEC enforcement staff cuts and PCAOB audit regulator budget and staff reductions?[23]
Reducing disclosure requirements or exempting more firms from internal control audits may lower costs on the margin. But it is not clear that these reductions would meaningfully change firms’ decisions to go public, especially when cheap private capital remains abundant. One of the primary benefits of staying private is the ability to retain control longer. If founders can grow their firms without subjecting themselves to analyst scrutiny, boards, and regulatory obligations, modest compliance savings may not shift that equilibrium.
If regulatory changes increase the number of public companies by a modest amount—say several hundred—those additional entrants will likely be the firms most sensitive to small cost reductions. That raises an important question: what are the characteristics of those marginal firms?
If such firms are highly cost-sensitive, they may also be more reluctant to invest in internal controls, governance, and compliance protections. Indeed, in my own research, I personally came across documented cases in which firms were willing to disclose material weaknesses in internal controls likely because hiring additional accounting personnel was deemed too costly. [24]
If such firms are highly cost-sensitive, they may also be more reluctant to invest in internal controls and basic financial reporting capacity. I remember one year reading every single material weakness disclosure submitted to the SEC, and some firms essentially said the same thing: they had a material weakness because they did not have sufficient accounting personnel, and it was “too costly” to hire more accountants. They treated that as an acceptable risk: disclosing a material weakness does not necessarily mean there is already a misstatement or a restatement; it means they are acknowledging that the risk of producing bad accounting is higher, but they are not willing to incur the cost now.[25] And we know that firms in that position are precisely the ones that often end up with restatements later.
In that sense, the cost is paid either now—through stronger controls and staffing—or later, when shareholders absorb the consequences through stock declines. The question is not whether the cost exists, but when it is imposed and who ultimately bears it.
Such disclosures do not immediately imply restatements, but evidence shows that firms with material weaknesses are more likely to experience reporting problems later. The cost is borne either upfront, through stronger controls, or later, through investor losses.
In that sense, shifting costs forward or backward does not eliminate them. It reallocates them.
Private Capital and Market Forces
Another factor is the availability of cheap private capital. Some literature suggests that abundant private funding is a primary reason for the decline in public-company counts. If that is the case, deliberately counteracting those market forces may amount to leaning against the wind.
Even if public-company costs are reduced, firms with access to attractive private funding may still prefer to remain private longer in order to retain control and flexibility. Reducing disclosure burdens or internal control requirements may not be sufficient to overcome those structural advantages.
Technological changes such as artificial intelligence may lower the cost of producing disclosure. Standardized information may be easier to generate. But automation introduces its own risks, including questions about reliability, oversight, and potential litigation exposure if disclosures are incomplete or misleading.
A Balanced Approach
The purpose of this analysis is not to argue that increasing the number of public companies is inherently harmful, nor that it is inherently beneficial. It is to introduce balance into a debate that often emphasizes only a potential wealth-building upside.
The equilibrium number of public companies is not determined by nostalgia for prior listing counts or by a desire to compete with and beat other listing markets such the UK.[26] It is determined by weighing marginal social benefits against marginal social costs. Those costs include enforcement capacity, governance infrastructure, information quality, and the risk profile of marginal entrants.
More public companies may expand opportunity. They may also increase exposure to failure and fraud if incentives are misaligned. The appropriate policy response requires systematic analysis rather than assumption.
The question is not simply whether we can make being public cheaper. It is whether doing so, at the margin, produces net social benefit once all costs are accounted for.
Conclusion
The decline in the number of publicly traded firms is a fact. Whether it represents a policy failure is an open question. More public companies do not automatically imply greater public wealth. They imply greater exposure to both upside and downside.
Any reform agenda aimed at increasing public listings should be grounded in empirical evidence about long-term investor returns, regulatory balance, fraud incidence, and capital allocation efficiency—not in nostalgia for prior market structures.
The purpose of this white paper is not to advocate for or against regulatory relaxation. It is to frame the issue properly: as a cost–benefit problem requiring rigorous economic analysis rather than rhetorical appeal.
© Francine McKenna, The Digging Company LLC, 2026
[1] See, e.g. https://www.quantillium.com/blog/annual-report-vs-form-10-k
[2] See, e.g. https://www.foley.com/insights/publications/2026/02/sec-chair-paul-atkins-pushes-risk-factor-reform-could-a-safe-harbor-mean-softer-enforcement
[3] Dyer, T., Lang, M., & Stice-Lawrence, L. (2017). The evolution of 10-K textual disclosure: Evidence from Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 64(2-3), 221-245.
[4] 2024 Audit Analytics reports an average audit fee of $3.26 million in 2024, representing an annual increase of 9% vs. 2023. See https://www.ideagen.com/resources/whitepapers/audit-fee-trends-20-year-review
[5] “Audit fees per $1 million of revenue fell slightly. In FY2024, audit fees per $1 million of client revenue averaged $612, a decrease of one percent from $619 in 2023. Audit fees per million dollars of revenue peaked in FY2006 at $743. In 2013, audit fees were $566 per $1 million of revenue, the lowest in IAA’s 20-year data series. Between FY2023 and FY2024, total SEC registrant revenue decreased by two percent while total audit fees increased by 0.6 percent”. See: https://www.auditupdate.com/post/audit-fees-continued-to-climb-in-2024; emphasis added
[6] See: https://www.ft.com/content/c891c47c-b21f-4e0f-84b3-b80c794eff3d
[7] With its requirement to disclose Critical Audit Matters, PCAOB attempted to enhance information content of audit reports beyond simple “pass-fail” model. Some evidence suggests that presence of CAMs enhances credibility of audit reports for retail investors but also increases their information overload. See Carver, B., Muriel, L., & Trinkle, B. S. (2023). Does the reporting of critical audit matters affect nonprofessional investors’ perceptions of auditor credibility, information overload, audit quality, and investment risk?. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 35(1), 21-44.
[8] The lack of perceived credibility of the audit report rose to such a level that the SEC recently had to defend it in the appeals court brief in a negligence lawsuit against an audit firm BDO. “The court in August ruled in favor of BDO on the grounds that the firm’s audit report was so general that an investor wouldn’t have relied on it. Consequently, the court said the audit report wasn’t material—meaning it didn’t matter—and upheld the dismissal of fraud claims against BDO. The ruling, by the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, prompted new debate within the accounting profession and among investors about whether audit reports serve a useful purpose. Audit reports operate on a pass-fail model, and their language is standardized”. Foley, S. (2024, February 16). SEC tells appeals court: Yes, audit reports do matter. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/stock-market-today-dow-jones-02-16-2024/card/sec-tells-appeals-court-yes-audit-reports-do-matter-eEcyCjYf9Rh7vfmweR5N; emphasis added
[9] https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-51
[10] https://www.fhnylaw.com/enforcement-news-more-than-1-500-sec-filings-affected-by-alleged-fraud-perpetrated-by-accounting-fi
[11] The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which checks auditor quality via an inspection process, looks at smaller audit firms—those that audit fewer than 100 issuers—only every three years, and there are so many more of them to review than larger audit firms.
“That means there’s some reason to be glad that there is concentration among auditors for the largest public companies, wrote Francine McKenna in ProMarket, the blog of the University of Chicago’s Stigler Center. “Audit work at those firms—Deloitte, KPMG, EY, and PwC—is inspected by the PCAOB every year and the inspections are rigorous. The bad news, however, is that if one of those global audit firms falters financially or fails, the remaining three will unlikely be able to absorb the clients, the work, and the employees the way four of them did back in 2002 following the failure of Arthur Andersen.”
[12] See, e.g., Gornall, W., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2020). Squaring venture capital valuations with reality. Journal of Financial Economics, 135(1), 120–143.; Huang, R., Ritter, J. R., & Zhang, D. (2023). IPOs and SPACs: Recent developments. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 15, 595–615. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-111021-100657
[13] In 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 respectively, there were 474, 262, 477, and 381 IPOs compared to 1980-2000 average of 310 IPOs. There was a precipitous drop in IPOs in 2001 to 79. By comparison in 2012 there were 94 IPOs. See Gao, X., Ritter, J. R., & Zhu, Z. (2013). Where have all the IPOs gone?. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(6), 1663-1692. According to a recent EY survey, IPO market has rebounded in recent years, reaching 215 in 2025. See https://www.ey.com/en_us/insights/ipo/ipo-market-trends
[14] See 2025 EY IPO report: “US IPO market activity increased in 2025, reflecting investor confidence despite lingering economic and geopolitical uncertainties. The technology, media and telecommunications (TMT) sector led issuance, propelled by strong interest in AI. The 2026 outlook is favorable, underpinned by a constructive market backdrop for IPOs and a strong pipeline”. https://www.ey.com/en_us/insights/ipo/ipo-market-trends
[15] In a recent “All In” Podcast, it was summarized as follows: “In the 1849 gold rush, Anthropic and OpenAI and all of these model makers are selling the pick and shovel in the gold rush. I am buying it and I’m trying to pan for gold. But as with the gold rush, most of these companies will go out of business.” See:
[16] According to one study in 2010, there were 5.7 million firms of which only 0.06% were listed. See Abudy, M., Benninga, S., & Shust, E. (2016). The cost of equity for private firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 37, 431-443. According to 2019 census, there were approximately 7.96 million firms in the US, . According to World Bank, there were 4,397 listed firms in the US, corresponding to 0.006%. However, this is somewhat misleading since of 7.96 million firms, approximately 7.75 million have fewer than 100 employees, while only 8,407 have over 1,000 employees. See https://paradoxesinc.com/prior-resources/us-business-patterns
[17] See, e.g. Coates, J. C. IV. (2023). The problem of twelve: When a few financial institutions control everything. Columbia Global Reports.; Rajgopal, S. (2023, May 8). What are we paying indexers for being passive? Part 1. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/shivaramrajgopal/2023/05/08/what-are-we-paying-indexers-for-being-passive-part-1
[18] See. e.g. Tang, Y. (2014). Information disclosure and price discovery. Journal of Financial Markets, 19, 39-61.
[19] Barclay, M. J., & Hendershott, T. (2003). Price discovery and trading after hours. The Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), 1041-1073.
[20] “… In their canonical form, such models rely on a basic story: some traders have private information and they trade on it; other traders see market data and they learn from it; and market prices adjust to efficient levels that reflect the information” (O’hara, M. (2015). High frequency market microstructure. Journal of financial economics, 116(2), 257-270. p. 263).
[21] See, e.g. Acharya, V. V., & Pedersen, L. H. (2005). Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of financial Economics, 77(2), 375-410.
[22] See, e.g. Campbell, J. Y. (2006). Household finance. Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1553–1604.
[23] “On May 6, 2025, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Paul Atkins, informed SEC staff that the agency had reduced its full-time headcount by 15% across various offices and divisions since the start of the federal government’s fiscal year in October 2024. At the end of the 2024 fiscal year, the SEC had 5,000 employees and 2,000 contractors. As of May 6, 2025, the SEC has 4,200 employees and 1,700 contractors.” See, e.g. https://www.winston.com/en/blogs-and-podcasts/capital-markets-and-securities-law-watch/sec-buyout-program-and-other-initiatives-lead-to-drop-in-enforcement-and-general-counsel-staff. Also the 2026 PCAOB budget approved by the SEC reflects a 9.4% ($37.6 million) decrease from the prior year and includes a 52% and 42% reduction in the chairperson and other Board members’ compensation, respectively. The accounting support fee (ASF) totals $306.0 million, an 18.4% ($68.9 million) decrease from the prior year, of which $280.3 million will be assessed on public company issuers and $25.7 million will be assessed on brokers and dealers. Available at: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2026-11-sec-approves-2026-pcaob-budget-accounting-support-fee
[24] See, for example, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/876523/000087652315000120/a201510-k.htm : “Management did not apply the appropriate authoritative accounting literature and thus reached incorrect conclusions with respect to proper accounting of certain Grupo Finmart structured asset sales as a result of the following deficiencies that, collectively, represent a material weakness: The appropriate accounting expertise (internally and externally) was not engaged, resulting in a failure to recognize important U.S. GAAP issues; The accounting consequences of significant, unusual transactions were not identified and evaluated;…” (emphasis added)
[25] Here is a more recent example of this for a foreign private issuer: “We have material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting. If any material weakness persists or if we fail to establish and maintain effective internal control over financial reporting, our ability to accurately report its financial results could be adversely affected. In connection with the preparation of the financial statement for the Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended June 30, 2025, our management evaluated the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting as of June 30, 2025 and determined they were not effective as described in Part II. Item 15. “Controls and Procedures” of this annual report. … The material weakness identified relates to insufficient accounting personnel with appropriate experience and knowledge to address complex accounting matters in accordance with U.S. GAAP.” See: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1735556/000110465925105009/btog-20250630x20f.htm
[26] See “The New Competition for Listings,” Global Finance Magazine, November 14, 2023. Available at: https://gfmag.com/capital-raising-corporate-finance/stock-exchanges-ipos-global-competition/
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